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Litigation under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA)1 has been the major growth area in the case law specific to 
K-12 education.2  The bulk of the litigation under the IDEA concerns 
the Act’s central pillar,3 the obligation of school districts to provide a 
“free appropriate public education” (FAPE)4 to students with 
disabilities,5 via an individualized education program (IEP).6  A 
notable segment of this frequent litigation is the overlapping 
                                                          
* Perry A. Zirkel is university professor of education and law at Lehigh 
University.  He has a Ph.D. in Education Administration, a J.D. from the University 
of Connecticut, and an LL.M. from Yale. 
 
1 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400 et seq. (West 2012).  For the related regulations, see 34 
C.F.R. §§ 300.1 et seq. (2012).  Initially enacted in 1975 as funding legislation 
under the broad title of Education of the Handicapped Act and the specific part 
called the Education for All Handicapped Children’s Act, this law has undergone 
major amendments during the reauthorizations in 1986, 1990, 1997, and 2004.  See, 
e.g., DIXIE S. HUEFNER & CYNTHIA M. HERR, NAVIGATING SPECIAL EDUCATION 
LAW AND POLICY 43–49 (2012).  
2 See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel & Brent L. Johnson, The “Explosion” in Education 
Litigation: An Update, 265 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2011).  
3 For this metaphor to characterize FAPE, see, e.g., Sytsema v. Acad. Sch. 
Dist. No. 20, 538 F.3d 1306, 1312 (10th Cir. 2008) (“The FAPE concept is the 
central pillar of the IDEA statutory structure.”); cf. Petit v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 
675 F.3d 769, 772 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“The cornerstone of the Act is . . . that schools 
provide children with a ‘[FAPE]’”); M.A. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist., 344 F.3d 
335, 338 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The cornerstone . . . under the IDEA is the substantive 
right of disabled children to a ‘[FAPE]’”). 
4 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1401(9), 1412(a)(1) (West 2012). 
5 See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Case Law under the IDEA, in IDEA: A HANDY 
DESK REFERENCE TO THE LAW, REGULATIONS AND INDICATORS 669 (2012).  The 
issue typology of this annotated outline corresponds generally to the overall 
classifications in special education law texts and topical indexes, but each one 
represents notable variations of these overall themes depending on purpose, level, 
and judgment.  This source separates the category of FAPE from that of remedies, 
i.e., tuition reimbursement and compensatory education, while expressly 
acknowledging their integral overlap.  In this compilation of IDEA case law, the 
FAPE classification alone accounts for the majority of the decisions, and these 
other two overlapping categories add to this majority. 
6 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1401(14), 1414(d) (West 2012).  Because the IEP is the 
operational vehicle for FAPE, courts often characterize it with the same metaphors.  
See, e.g., White ex rel. White v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 343 F.3d 373, 378 (5th 
Cir. 2003) (“The cornerstone of the IDEA is the IEP.”); Hines v. Tullahoma City 
Sch. Sys., Nos. 97–5103, 97–5104, 156 F.3d 1229, 1998 WL 393814, at *1 (6th 
Cir. June 15, 1998) (“The IEP is the cornerstone of the Act.”). 
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categories for the principal remedies for denials of this FAPE 
obligation7—tuition reimbursement8 and compensatory education.9  
Additionally, because the IDEA provides a comprehensive system of 
administrative adjudication via impartial hearing officers (IHOs) and, 
in states that have selected the statutory option of a second tier, 
review officers (ROs),10 the body of pertinent case law extends to 
IHO and RO decisions.11 
                                                          
7 Zirkel, supra note 5, at 677–709.  For an early article providing an overview 
of the basic IDEA remedies, with emphasis on the judicial level, see Allan 
Osborne, Remedies for a School District’s Failure to Provide Services under IDEA, 
112 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (1996). 
8 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.148(c) (2012); 
Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993); Sch. Comm. of 
Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985).  For an empirical analysis of the 
tuition reimbursement case law, see Thomas Mayes & Perry A. Zirkel, Special 
Education Tuition Reimbursement Claims: An Empirical Analysis, 22 REMEDIAL & 
SPECIAL EDUC. 350 (2001).  For the comprehensive criteria and illustrative case law, 
see Perry A. Zirkel, Tuition and Related Reimbursement under the IDEA: A 
Decisional Checklist, 282 EDUC. L. REP. 785 (2012).  In short, the steps in this 
multi-part analysis are: (1) timely parental notice, (2) FAPE of the district’s 
proposed IEP, (3) appropriateness of the parental placement, and (4) other equities 
beyond timely notice.  Id.  
9 The statute does not expressly mention compensatory education, but the case 
law has clearly established it under the Act’s grant of broad equitable authority to 
adjudicators.  See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Compensatory Education: An Annotated 
Update of the Law, 251 EDUC. L. REP. 501 (2010).  For the analogy-based 
relationship of compensatory education with tuition reimbursement, see Perry 
Zirkel, Compensatory Education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act: The Third Circuit’s Partially Mis-Leading Position, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 879 
(2006).  For the prevailing two approaches for determining the appropriate amount 
of this remedy, which are generally referred to under the rubrics of “quantitative” 
and “qualitative,” see Perry A. Zirkel, Two Competing Approaches for Calculating 
Compensatory Education under the IDEA, 257 EDUC. L. REP. 550 (2010). 
10 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)–(j) (2006); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.507–300.518 (2012).  The 
number of states that have opted for a second tier has gradually dwindled to 
approximately ten.  Perry A. Zirkel & Gina Scala, Due Process Hearing Systems 
under the IDEA: A State-by-State Survey, 21 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 3, 5 
(2010). 
11 In addition to the state education agency websites that make these decisions 
available, a national sampling, akin to the reporter series for federal and state court 
decisions generally and in specialized subject areas, is available in the INDIVIDUALS 
WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION LAW REPORT (IDELR) and in LRP Publications’ 
broader electronic database, Special Ed Connection.
®
  For the overall picture of the 
pertinent case law, see Perry A. Zirkel & Amanda C. Machin, The Special 
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Under the landmark decision for FAPE, Board of Education v. 
Rowley,12 the Supreme Court established a two-part test for 
determining whether a school district met this central obligation 
under the IDEA: 1) “has the [district] complied with the procedures 
set forth in the Act?,” and 2) “is the [IEP] . . . reasonably calculated 
to enable the child to receive educational benefits?”13  In interpreting 
Congressional intent as emphasizing the first of these two sides, the 
Rowley majority seemed to suggest strictness with regard to 
procedural compliance14 and a relatively relaxed substantive 
standard.15  In the hundreds of FAPE decisions after Rowley, the 
lower courts confirmed and continued the relatively low substantive 
standard for FAPE despite contrary scholarly commentary based on 
the successive amendments to the Act.16  The Rowley lower court 
progeny also developed a relaxed interpretation of its procedural side, 
                                                          
Education Case Law “Iceberg”: An Initial Exploration of the Underside, 41 J.L. & 
EDUC. 483 (2012).  In contrast, the coverage of this article does not extend to the 
alternate and distinguishable enforcement avenue under the IDEA, the state 
complaint resolution process.  See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel & Brooke L. McGuire, A 
Roadmap to Legal Dispute Resolution for Parents of Students with Disabilities, 23 
J. SPECIAL EDUC. LEADERSHIP 100 (2010) (differentiating the administrative from 
the adjudicatory routes of dispute resolution under the IDEA as well as under 
Section 504).  The litigation concerning this other enforcement avenue is limited 
and covered elsewhere.  See Perry A. Zirkel, Legal Boundaries for the IDEA 
Complaint Resolution Process, 237 EDUC. L. REP. 565 (2011) (canvassing the 
various primary available legal sources, such as IDEA regulations and U.S. 
Department of Education policy interpretations, specific to the state complaint 
resolution process).  
12 458 U.S. 176 (1982). 
13 Id. at 206–07. 
14 See, e.g., id. at 206 (“We think that congressional emphasis upon full 
participation of concerned parties throughout the development of the IEP . . . 
demonstrates the legislative conviction that adequate compliance with the 
procedures prescribed would in most cases assure much if not all of what Congress 
wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP.”). 
15 This relaxed view is evident in (1) the Court’s equating the Act’s procedural 
emphasis with access and its sketchy substantive standard with a “basic floor of 
opportunity,” id. at 200–01, and (2) the Court’s concluding emphasis on deference 
to governmental education authorities, id. at 208–09. 
16 See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Have the Amendments to the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act Razed Rowley and Raised the Substantive Standard for 
“Free Appropriate Public Education?”, 28 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 
397 (2008). 
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amounting to another two-part test that connects the two sides: (1) 
did the district violate one or more procedural requirements of the 
Act, and, if so, (2) did the violation(s) result in loss of educational 
benefit to the child?17 
In the 2004 amendments to the IDEA, Congress codified this 
procedural standard, with a possible per se exception for 
“significantly imped[ing] the parent’s opportunity to participate in 
the decision-making process regarding the provision of a [FAPE] . . . 
to the parent’s child.”18  Finally, the courts have also established 
another type of denial of FAPE19—insufficient implementation of the 
IEP.20 
The legal literature to date concerning the remedies for denials of 
FAPE is largely limited.21  In the only article specifically and 
                                                          
17 See, e.g., Ridley Sch. Dist. v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2012); K.E. ex rel. 
K.E. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 15, 647 F.3d 795 (8th Cir. 2011); L.M. ex rel. Sam M. 
v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 556 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 2009); A.C. ex rel. M.C. v. 
Bd. of Educ., 553 F.3d 165 (2d Cir. 2009); Sytsema ex rel. Sytsema v. Acad. Sch. 
Dist. No. 20, 538 F.3d 1306 (10th Cir. 2008); Hjortness ex rel. Hjortness v. Neenah 
Joint Sch. Dist., 507 F.3d 1060 (7th Cir. 2007); Nack ex rel. Nack v. Orange City 
Sch. Dist., 454 F.3d 604 (6th Cir. 2006); L.T. ex rel. N.B. v. Warwick Sch. Comm., 
361 F.3d 80 (1st Cir. 2004); Adam J. ex rel. Robert J. v. Keller Indep. Sch. Dist., 
328 F.3d 804 (5th Cir. 2003); DiBuo ex rel. DiBuo v. Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d 184 
(4th Cir. 2002); Sch. Bd. v. K.C., 285 F.3d 977 (11th Cir. 2002). 
18 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(II) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.513(a)(2) (2012). 
19 Alternatively, this type may be regarded as one of two subsets on the 
substantive side of FAPE—formulation and implementation. 
20 See, e.g., Woods v. Northport Pub. Sch., 487 F. App’x 968 (6th Cir. 2012); 
Sumter Cnty. Sch. Dist. 17 v. Heffernan ex rel. TH, 642 F.3d 478 (4th Cir. 2011); 
Van Duyn ex rel. Van Duyn v. Baker Sch. Dist. 5J, 502 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2007); 
Melissa S. ex rel. Karen S. v. Sch. Dist., 183 F. App’x 184 (3d Cir. 2006); L.C. v. 
Utah State Bd. of Educ., 125 F. App’x 252 (10th Cir. 2005); Alex R. ex rel. Beth R. 
v. Forrestville Valley Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. #221, 375 F.3d 603 (7th Cir. 2004). 
21 Aside from the few specialized articles (supra notes 7–9), the bulk of the 
scholarly commentary addresses IDEA remedies only incidentally.  See, e.g., Elisa 
Hyman, Dean Hill Rivkin, & Steven A. Rosenbaum, How IDEA Fails Families 
without Means: Causes and Corrections from the Frontlines of Special Education 
Lawyering, 20 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 107 (2011) (arguing for various 
reforms in the private and public enforcement of the IDEA, including statutory 
codification of the compensatory education remedy); Eloise Pasachof, Special 
Education, Poverty, and the Limits of Private Enforcement, 86 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1413 (2011) (advocating greater public enforcement of the IDEA); Jon 
Romberg, The Means Justify the Ends: Structural Due Process in Special 
Education Law, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 415 (2011) (deconstructing three procedural 
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comprehensively addressing IDEA remedies,22 Zirkel demarcated the 
development of the Act’s broad adjudicatory authorization for “such 
relief as the court determines is appropriate.”23 More specifically, 
canvassing the case law, agency policy interpretations, and related 
legal sources, he identified the major forms of injunctive relief 
available to IHOs/ROs24 and courts for denials of FAPE,25 including: 
(1) tuition reimbursement; (2) compensatory education; (3) 
prospective revisions of the IEP; (4) prospective placement; and (5) 
evaluations.26  In tracing the boundaries for this remedial authority, 
the Zirkel article also recited the prevailing judicial view that 
                                                          
principles for decision-making under the IDEA); Michael Rebell, Special 
Education Inclusion and the Courts, 25 J.L. & EDUC. 523 (1996) (proposing a 
“community engagement dialogic” model for resolving major educational 
controversies, such as inclusion under the IDEA).  The student law review articles 
tend to be specific to a particular IDEA remedy and relatively superficial.  See, e.g., 
Katie Harrison, Note, Direct Tuition Payments under the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act, 25 J. CIV. RTS. ECON. DEV. 873 (2011) (advocating 
remedy of direct, as alternative to reimbursed, tuition payment); T. Daris Isbell, 
Note, Making Up for Lost Educational Opportunities: Distinguishing between 
Compensatory Education and Additional Services As Remedies under the IDEA, 76 
BROOK. L. REV. 1717 (2011) (confusing a New York review officer decision’s term 
of “additional services” as a recognized and recommended remedy distinct from 
compensatory education); Amy D. Quinn, Comment, Obtaining Tuition 
Reimbursement for Children with Special Needs, 80 UMKC L. REV. 1211 (2012) 
(recommending a purportedly useful template of four factors for deciding tuition 
reimbursement cases, which do not square with the statute, regulations, or case 
law). 
22 Perry A. Zirkel, The Remedial Authority of Hearing and Review Officers 
under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: An Update, 31 J. NAT’L 
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1 (2011). 
23 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.516(c)(3) (2012). 
24 The pertinent legal authorities treat the remedial authority of IHOs/ROs as 
derived from and largely commensurate with the remedial authority of the courts.  
Zirkel, supra note 22, at 8 n.29. 
25 The denial of FAPE amounts to the basic form of remedy, which is 
declaratory relief.  Other remedies are specific to IDEA obligations that are 
generally separable from FAPE denials.  See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Independent 
Educational Evaluations at District Expense under the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 223 (2009). 
26 Zirkel, supra note 22, at 15–24.  Other, more creative and controversial 
remedies—sometimes included under the rubric of compensatory education—are 
ordering training of district personnel or district hiring of consultants.  Id. at 28–32. 
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monetary damages are not available under the IDEA.27  Finally, the 
typology for the present analysis identifies prospective services as a 
separate remedy, although the Zirkel article treated it as ancillary or 
subsidiary to IEP revisions and particular placements.28 
In the absence of any published data on the remedies that 
IHOs/ROs and courts determine after finding a denial of FAPE, the 
purpose of this study is to provide a systematic analysis of the 
pertinent case law.  The specific questions are:  
 
(1) What is the relative frequency of the various types of FAPE 
violations?   
(2) What is the relative frequency of the various IDEA 
remedies?29  
(3) For the most frequent remedies, does the distribution differ 
markedly between IHO/RO and court decisions?30 
(4) Do certain states have a particular propensity for the most 
frequent remedies?31 
(5) What has been the adjudicative disposition, or outcomes, of 
these predominant remedies?32 
                                                          
27 Id. at 5 (citing, e.g., A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Sch., 486 F.3d 791 (3d Cir. 
2007); Diaz-Fonseca v. Puerto Rico, 451 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2006); Ortega v. Bibb 
Cnty. Sch. Dist., 397 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2005); Polera v. Bd. of Educ., 288 F.3d 
478 (2d Cir. 2002); Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 233 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 2000); 
Thompson ex rel. Buckhanon v. Bd. of Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 144 F.3d 574 (8th 
Cir. 1998); Sellers v. Sch. Bd., 141 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 1998); Charlie F. ex rel. Neil 
F. v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
28 Prospective services may be viewed as a more limited version and, thus, 
subsidiary part of 1) what should have been in the IEP or what was in the IEP but 
not implemented, or 2) what the child should receive as a placement as the result of 
a denial of FAPE.  However, the line between prospective and retrospective is far 
from a bright one, especially given the blurry boundaries for compensatory 
education.  See, e.g., Mr. I v. Maine Sch. Admin. Unit No. 55, 480 F.3d 1, 26 (1st 
Cir. 2007) (fusing and confusing compensatory education with purely prospective 
revisions to the IEP). 
29 “Frequency” in this context is limited to instances where the remedy being at 
issue, i.e., addressed by the IHO/RO or court, in the wake of a denial of FAPE.  
Thus, the count does not include instances where the IHO/RO or court opinion 
mentioned or discussed the remedy but did not rule on it. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Thus, here the conversion is from the remedy being at issue to its outcome, 
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(6) Does any other, more qualitative33 trend emerge as notable? 
 
I.   METHOD 
 
Because it provides the broadest national sampling of IHO/RO 
and court case law under the IDEA, Special Ed Connection
®34 served 
as the database for this study.35  The resulting sample selection 
consisted of two steps.  The first step was to screen all of the 
decisions from January 1, 200036 to December 20, 201237 listed under 
the following overlapping headings in the topical index: FAPE 
Generally – 200.030; Procedural Violations as Denial – 200.035; 
Reasonably Calculated to Provide FAPE – 200.040; Calculation of 
Educational Benefit – 200.015; and Right to FAPE – 200.050.38  The 
purpose of the initial review was to sift out the various cited 
decisions where the HO/RO or court concluded that the defendant 
district39 did not violate its FAPE obligations40 or otherwise did not 
                                                          
i.e., whether the IHO/RO or court granted, denied, or disposed of it otherwise in its 
final order. 
33 In this context, “qualitative” is simply in contrast to “quantitative,” although 
recognizing the ultimate overlap of these two research approaches. 
34 See supra note 11. 
35 For the resulting citations provided infra, “IDELR” refers to the decisions 
available in the hard-copy reporter series, whereas “LRP” refers to those decisions 
available only in the electronic database.  Moreover, following customary use, 
citations to IHO/RO decisions are designated by “SEA,” because state education 
agencies are responsible for providing the aforementioned (supra text 
accompanying note 10) one- or two-tier system for administrative adjudications 
under the IDEA. 
36 The selection of this starting date provided for the most recent period of at 
least a decade marked by the turn of the century. 
37 The ending date was the time of the data collection.  Thus, some of the cases 
decided within the last few months of 2012 were not included in the sample due to 
the time lag in publishing decisions.  This limited incompleteness warranted a 
projected figure for the final year in the frequency chart of Figure 1. 
38 Although the overall topical heading “Free Appropriate Public Education 
(FAPE)” included other subheadings, an exploratory sampling of each one revealed 
that the cases where the IHO/RO or court found a denial of FAPE were already 
included in the comprehensive coverage of the selected subheadings. 
39 Although the usage consistently herein follows the customary plaintiff-
parent and defendant-district typology for IDEA cases, this user-friendly 
characterization obscures nuances of adjudicative level, possible parent-child 
differences (e.g., Winkelman v. Parma Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007)), and the 
 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 33-1 
 
222 
find a denial of FAPE41 under the IDEA.42  The second step was 
carefully reading and coding each of the remaining FAPE-denial 
decisions in terms of two key variables.43  One variable was the type 
of FAPE denial, using the following four categories:44 
                                                          
occasional case in this study’s sample where the district filed for the impartial 
hearing. 
40 The incidental finding—without specifically tallying the exact numbers—in 
screening the decisions under these topical headings was that the FAPE decisions 
in favor of districts clearly outnumbered those in favor of the parents.  This trend 
comports with that of a more systematic sampling of IDEA decisions.  Zirkel, 
supra note 5, at 677–709. 
41 In some cases, FAPE overlaps with “child find,” the obligation to evaluate a 
child reasonably suspected as qualifying for an evaluation and/or eligibility under 
the IDEA, including compliance with the regulatory criteria for its timing and 
scope.  See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, The Law of Evaluations under the IDEA: An 
Annotated Update, EDUC. L. REP. (forthcoming 2013).  Thus, the screening 
included determining which cases to exclude as not fitting within this FAPE 
overlap. 
42 As a threshold matter, decisions under Section 504 or other legal bases were 
excluded.  See, e.g., Nixon v. Greenup Cnty. Sch. Dist., 890 F. Supp. 2d 753 (E.D. 
Ky. 2012); Wiles v. Dep’t of Educ., 555 F. Supp. 2d 1143 (D. Haw. 2008); Fox 
Chapel Area Sch. Dist., 59 IDELR ¶ 208 (Pa. SEA 2012).  Second, cases that were 
specific to FAPE but decided under the IDEA’s complaint resolution process were 
excluded.  See, e.g., Student with a Disability, 109 LRP 13190 (Mont. SEA 2009); 
Student with a Disability, 45 IDELR ¶ 293 (Haw. SEA 2006); Shakopee Indep. 
Sch. Dist. No. 720, 45 IDELR ¶ 171 (Minn. SEA 2005).  Third, decisions that were 
specific to FAPE under the IDEA but inconclusive were excluded.  See, e.g., D.F. 
ex rel. N.F. v. Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist., 430 F.3d 595 (2d Cir. 2005) (remanded to 
district court for reconsideration); R.S. v. Montgomery Twp. Bd. of Educ., 59 
IDELR ¶ 47 (D.N.J. 2012); Banks ex rel. D.B. v. District of Columbia, 720 F. 
Supp. 2d 83 (D.D.C. 2010); Hunter v. District of Columbia, 51 IDELR ¶ 34 
(D.D.C. 2008) (remanding to the IHO for final determination).  Finally, the 
exclusions also extended the various decisions under the IDEA limited to technical 
adjudicative issues rather than the merits of FAPE.  See, e.g., K.C. v. Bd. of Educ., 
48 IDELR ¶ 6 (D. Md. 2007) (additional evidence); A.H. v. State of New Jersey 
Dep’t of Educ., 46 IDELR ¶ 252 (D.N.J. 2006) (exhaustion); Bd. of Educ., 46 
IDELR ¶ 173 (N.Y. SEA 2003) (statute of limitations); Woodland Sch. Dist. 50, 36 
IDELR ¶ 115 (Ill. SEA 2002) (mootness). 
43 At this step, the relatively few cases that had more than one decision specific 
to FAPE and its remedy, such as an affirmance, modification, or reversal upon 
appeal, were limited to the final decision on the merits.  For example, the report for 
the IHO’s decision in McKinney Independent School District, 54 IDELR ¶ 33 (Tex. 
2010) cross-referenced subsequent judicial decisions in the same case; thus, the 
coding was limited to the court’s affirmance in S.F. v. McKinney Independent 
School District, 58 IDELR ¶ 157 (E.D. Tex. 2012), magistrate’s report adopted, 59 
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(1) Procedural; 
(2) Substantive; 
(3) Implementation; and 
(4) Combination.45 
 
The other variable was the type of remedy at issue and ruled upon 
in the case, i.e., where the parent sought one or more of the following 
forms of relief as an order from the IHO/RO or court.46  More 
specifically, the typology of IDEA remedies for coding in this study 
was follows:47 
 
 Tuition and related reimbursement48 
                                                          
IDELR ¶ 261 (E.D. Tex. 2012).  Similarly excluded were decisions solely 
concerning attorneys’ fees, which is not only a separable issue but also exclusive to 
the court segment of the cases.  Finally, where the IHO/RO or court opinion 
addressed various issues, the coding was limited to the rulings specific to the 
FAPE-denial and its remedy. 
44 The coding also included a catchall “not ascertainable” category for the 
relatively few cases where the IHO/RO or court opinion did not specify, either 
explicitly or implicitly, the basis for the FAPE denial. 
45 In these cases, the denial of FAPE was premised on separable procedural 
and either substantive-formulation or substantive-implementation grounds (i.e., 
violations of each side of the two-part Rowley test, supra text accompanying note 
13, or in combination with the implementation standard, supra text accompanying 
note 20). 
46 “At issue” here is purposely broad, referring to all FAPE-denial cases where 
the IHO/RO or court expressly made a determination of the remedy, which may 
have been to grant, deny, partially grant and partially deny, or remand (for either 
further proceedings or to the IEP team) it.   
47 All of these remedies are in addition to the basic declaratory relief that the 
district has denied the child FAPE.  Moreover, the first three of them tend to be 
more retrospective, whereas the remaining three are more prospective, although 
these chronological orientations are overlapping rather than mutually exclusive. 
48 “Tuition and related reimbursement” is used herein for two reasons—one as 
a general reminder and the other as a special consideration.  First, per the model in 
Zirkel, supra note 8, this remedy, which stems from the Supreme Court’s decisions 
in School Committee of Burlington v. Department of Education, 471 U.S. 359 
(1985), and Florence County School District Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993), is 
generally understood to extend broadly to various expenses beyond or in lieu of 
tuition, such as tutoring, related services, or assistive technology.  Second, the issue 
of reimbursement or payment for independent educational evaluations (IEEs) posed 
a special consideration here.  More specifically, the blurry boundary between these 
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 Compensatory education;49 
 Money damages;50 
 Prospective IEP revisions; 
 Prospective services;51 and 
 Evaluation.52 
                                                          
related remedies resulted in a special coding resolution.  The broad category of 
“tuition and related reimbursement” extended here to include the four IHO 
decisions that treated the IEE issue as inseparably part of the FAPE denial.  See, 
e.g., Monrovia Unified Sch. Dist., 108 LRP 10494 (Cal. SEA 2008); Chicago Pub. 
Sch., 44 IDELR ¶ 294 (Ill. SEA 2005).  However, the coding excluded IEE 
reimbursement or payment rulings where this relief was based on the parallel but 
separable multi-part test, which is premised on the appropriateness of the 
evaluation rather than the appropriateness of the IEP.  For this separate test and 
case law, see, e.g., Zirkel supra note 25; Perry A. Zirkel, Independent Educational 
Evaluation Reimbursement: A Checklist, 231 EDUC. L. REP. 21 (2008). 
49 The boundary for this remedy is also blurry, perhaps because it is still 
evolving and has yet to receive Supreme Court or congressional clarification.  For 
purposes of coding, the coverage was broad, including cases where the IHO/RO or 
court ordered some other relief, such as prospective placement, under the express 
or at least implicit treatment as compensatory education.  See, e.g., Pickens Cnty. 
Sch. Dist., 110 LRP 2301 (Ga. SEA 2009) (ordering residential placement 
expressly as compensatory education); Tyler Indep. Sch. Dist, 60 IDELR ¶ 59 
(Tex. SEA 2012) (ordering, without labeling it as compensatory education, 
continued private placement for a prescribed period in addition to tuition 
reimbursement where parent requested both compensatory education and tuition 
reimbursement). 
50 Although unavailable in most jurisdictions now, this remedy was included as 
a category in the data collection for the sake of completeness, especially given that 
the precedents accumulated largely during this almost 13-year period.  See supra 
note 27.  However, given its minimal frequency, it became part of the 
Miscellaneous Other category in the reporting of the results.  See infra note 64. 
51 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.  “Services” in this context is 
broad, extending to personnel, such as an aide, and equipment, such as assistive 
technology devices.  See, e.g., Boston Pub. Sch., 59 IDELR ¶ 178 (Mass. SEA 
2012).  This category overlapped with compensatory education, which made it 
difficult to distinguish the two, especially in cases where the written opinion did 
not refer expressly to compensatory education.  For example, New York review 
officer decisions have blurred these two types of remedies under the term “added 
services.”  See, e.g., Student with a Disability, 50 IDELR ¶ 120 (N.Y. SEA 2008). 
52 Similar to the exclusion or coding of IEE reimbursement, “evaluation” was 
here reserved for decisions where the IHO/RO or court found a denial of FAPE and 
ordered this remedy as part of the relief directly for this denial, not for some other, 
separable reason.  See, e.g., K.I. v. Montgomery Pub. Sch., 805 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 
57 IDELR ¶ 93 (M.D. Ala. 2011) (ordering reevaluation for new IEP); Boston Pub. 
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The resulting sample53 consisted of 224 decisions.  Of these 
decisions, 140 (63%) were at the IHO or RO level, with the 
remaining 84 (38%) at the court level.54  Figure 1 shows the 
frequency of these decisions per year, which approximates the rising 
trajectory of special education and FAPE case law more generally.55 
 
                                                          
Sch., 59 IDELR ¶ 178 (Mass. SEA 2012) (ordering evaluation to determine new 
IEP, including whether the child needed the prospective service of a 1:1 aide); 
Roswell Indep. Sch. Dist., 36 IDELR ¶ 19 (N.M. SEA 2001) (ordering evaluation 
to determine not only IEP but also compensatory education).  In a few of these 
cases, typically premised on the IDEA’s child find obligation, the explicit finding 
of a denial of FAPE was only marginal.  See, e.g., Hawkins v. District of Columbia, 
49 IDELR ¶ 213 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding denial of FAPE in upholding IHO’s order 
for an evaluation to determine eligibility).     
53 The reference to “sample” is based on the understanding that the population 
consists of a larger number of decisions that either escape this rather broad net of 
topical index categories or, inevitably, does not appear in this database.  See Zirkel 
& Machin, supra note 11, at 508–09.  Although the size of the sample serves to 
mitigate this limitation, representativeness remains an issue.  See, e.g., Anastasia 
D’Angelo, J. Gary Lutz, & Perry A. Zirkel, Are Published IDEA Hearing Officer 
Decisions Representative? 14 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 241 (2004).   
54 Rounding of decimals more than .5% accounts here and elsewhere in this 
study for sums that are slightly more or less than 100%. 
55 See, e.g., Zirkel & Johnson, supra note 2, at 5–6 (special education court 
decisions); Perry A. Zirkel & Anastasia D’Angelo, Special Education Case Law: 
An Empirical Trends Analysis, 161 EDUC. L. REP. 731 (2002) (special education 
court and IHO/RO decisions); Perry A. Zirkel & Karen Gischlar, Due Process 
Hearings under the IDEA: A Longitudinal Frequency Analysis, 21 J. SPECIAL 
EDUC. LEADERSHIP 22 (2008) (special education IHO/RO decisions); Zirkel, supra 
note 5, at 677–709 (FAPE court decisions).  
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Figure 1. 
 
 
The states where these cases most frequently arose were: (1) New 
York—thirty-five (16%); (2) California—thirty-two (14%); (3) 
Hawaii—twenty-two (10%); (4) Pennsylvania—nineteen (8%); (5) 
New Jersey—thirteen (6%); (6) Texas—eleven (5%); and (7) 
Alaska—ten (4%),56 again approximating the pattern for IDEA and 
FAPE cases more generally.57 
 
II.   RESULTS 
 
The distribution of the FAPE violations for the 224 decisions 
was, in order of frequency, as follows: 
 
(1) Substantive—ninety-eight (44%); 
(2) Procedural—eighty-two (37%);58 
                                                          
56 Thus, these seven states accounted for 63% of the 224 decisions. 
57 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.  The major exceptions were the 
District of Columbia, which only accounted for eight (4%) of the cases in this 
sample but is one of the top two jurisdictions for the IDEA and FAPE cases more 
generally, and Alaska, which is in the lower group of jurisdictions for these cases 
more generally.  
58 Aligned with the recent codification (20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E) (2006) and 
34 C.F.R. § 300.513(a)(2) (2012)), the most common procedural violation was 
denial of a meaningful opportunity for parental participation.  See, e.g., D.B. v. 
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(3) Combination—twenty-seven (12%);59 
(4) Implementation—nine (4%); and 
(5) Not ascertainable—eight (4%)60 
 
Thus, substantive and procedural violations respectively 
predominated, with insufficient implementation being the basis in 
relatively few cases and with the particular basis for the denial of 
FAPE being unclear in a similarly low proportion of the cases. 
The distribution of the 294 “remedial rulings,”61 in order of 
frequency of each type, is presented in Table 1.  Because some of the 
decisions had more than one remedy at issue,62 the proportional 
frequencies varied in relation to the total number of remedial rulings 
and decisions, respectively.63 
                                                          
Gloucester Twp. Sch. Dist., No. 10–4630, 2012 WL 2930226 (3d Cir. July 19, 
2012); Dep’t of Educ., 55 IDELR ¶ 300 (Haw. SEA 2010); Acton-Agua Dulce 
Unified Sch. Dist., 36 IDELR ¶ 36 (Cal. SEA 2001). 
59 Of these twenty-seven cases, twenty-three were based on the combination of 
procedural and substantive-formulation grounds, and the remaining four were 
based on the combination of procedural and substantive-implementation grounds. 
60 In some of these cases, the basis was the overlapping issue of child find, but 
without any indication of whether the adjudicator considered the denial of FAPE as 
procedural or substantive.  See, e.g., Scott v. District of Columbia, 45 IDELR ¶ 160 
(D.D.C. 2006).  The other cases in this limited category included decisions where 
the district conceded the denial of FAPE, e.g., N.R. v. Dep’t of Educ., 52 IDELR ¶ 
92 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), or the adjudicator did not include sufficient information to 
make this classification, e.g., San Dieguito Union High Sch. Dist. v. Guray-Jacobs, 
44 IDELR ¶ 189 (S.D. Cal. 2005). 
61 This term is used here to differentiate the ruling in the decision for each type 
of remedy at issue.  For the potential significant difference among various units of 
analysis, see, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel & Caitlin A. Lyons, Restraining the Use of 
Restraints for Students with Disabilities: An Empirical Analysis of the Case Law, 
10 CONN. PUB. INTEREST L.J. 323, 337 (2011).  Customizing the differentiated 
model to the specific purposes of this analysis, the units are: 1) “decision,” which 
here is the same as the case; 2) “remedial ruling,” which here refers to the 
frequency of each type of remedy at issue in the decision (see supra note 29 and 
text accompanying note 46); and 3) “outcome,” which refers to the adjudicator’s 
disposition of the remedy at issue (see infra text accompanying notes 72–81). 
62 The respective totals of 294 and 224 resulted in an average of 1.31 remedial 
rulings per decision. 
63 The second column in Table 1 presents raw frequencies, whereas the third 
and fourth columns present the proportional frequencies in terms of the respective 
frames of reference.  Moreover, the figures in the final column add up to more than 
100% due to the multiple remedies at issue in some of the decisions.  
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Table 1.  Frequency of Types of Remedies  
Type of Remedy Frequency 
Proportion of 
All Rulings 
(n=294) 
Proportion 
of All 
Decisions 
(n=224) 
Tuition and Related 
Reimbursement 
n = 105 36% 47% 
Compensatory 
Education 
n = 88 30% 39% 
Prospective IEP 
Revisions 
n = 42 14% 19% 
Prospective 
Services 
n = 24 8% 11% 
Prospective 
Placement 
n = 22 7% 10% 
Evaluation n = 8 3% 4% 
Miscellaneous 
Other64 
n = 5 2% 2% 
 
Table 1 reveals that the most frequent, or predominant, remedies 
are (1) tuition and reimbursement and (2) compensatory education.  
More specifically, tuition reimbursement accounted for almost half of 
all the decisions and more than a third of all the remedial rulings, 
while compensatory education accounted for an additional 39% and 
30% of the decisions and rulings, respectively.  The frequency of the 
other types of remedies was at a markedly lower level.     
For the two predominant remedies of tuition and related 
reimbursement and compensatory education, Table 2 presents the 
relative frequencies of rulings in the two successive adjudicative 
                                                          
64 For the decisions in this catchall category, see D.B. v. Gloucester Twp. Sch. 
Dist., No. 10–4630, 2012 WL 2930226 (3d Cir. July 19, 2012) (denying 
availability of money damages under the IDEA); Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. M.P., 45 
IDELR ¶ 253 (Alaska Super. Ct. 2006) (not specifying a remedy beyond 
declaratory relief); Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 42 IDELR ¶ 223 (Ariz. SEA 
2005) (upholding order for the district to re-do the manifestation determination 
review); Warwick Sch. Comm., 36 IDELR ¶ 179 (R.I. SEA 2002); Klein Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 34 IDELR ¶ 140 (Tex. SEA 2000) (ordering reinstatement of the 
student). 
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forums under the IDEA.  Because some of the decisions only 
addressed other types of remedies, the percentages do not add up to 
100.65  Moreover, because some of the decisions addressed more than 
one of these two remedies, the cells in each column are not mutually 
exclusive.66 
 
Table 2.  Proportion of Predominant Remedies by Adjudicative 
Forum 
Adjudicative Forum Tuition and Related Reimbursement 
Compensatory 
Education 
Court Decisions 
(n=84) 
52% (n=44) 39% (n=33) 
IHO/RO Decisions 
(n=140) 
 
44% (n=61) 39% (n=55) 
 
This table shows that the courts face tuition and related 
reimbursement more frequently than do IHOs/ROs,67 but these two 
forums do not differ in their relative frequency of compensatory 
education.68 
For these two predominant remedies, Table 3 presents the relative 
proportions for each of the seven most frequent states.69 
 
                                                          
65 The percentages here represent the number of remedial rulings for each of 
these two types divided by the number of decisions in the respective forums, thus 
corresponding for comparison purposes to the final column of Table 1. 
66 This lack of independence precluded the use of inferential statistics (e.g., chi 
square analysis) for comparison of the two forums. 
67 This notable difference upon “eye-balled” examination is not necessarily 
generalizable in terms of statistical significance. 
68 The aforementioned (supra note 42) exclusion of the few IHO/RO decisions 
that were subject to an IDELR-published judicial appeal, thus limiting the sample 
to final decisions, serves as another cautionary consideration in this comparison. 
69 See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
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Table 3.  Proportion of Predominant Remedies by State70 
Most Frequent 
States 
Tuition and Related 
Reimbursement 
(45% of Decisions) 
Compensatory 
Education 
(39% of 
Decisions) 
New York (n=35) 63% (n=22) 23% (n=8) 
California (n=32) 38% (n=12) 41% (n=13) 
Hawaii (n=22) 77% (n=17) 18% (n=4) 
Pennsylvania (n=19) 32% (n=6) 89% (n=17) 
New Jersey (n=13) 69% (n=9) 8% (n=1) 
Texas (n=11) 36% (n=4) 55% (n=6) 
Alaska (n=10) 30% (n=3) 20% (n=2) 
 
Upon comparing proportions for the two types of remedies to 
those for the total sample of decisions, Hawaii, New Jersey, and New 
York appear to have a particular propensity for tuition and related 
reimbursement; while Pennsylvania and, to a lesser extent, Texas 
have a propensity for compensatory education.71 
Whereas the foregoing analyses were based on the remedy being 
at issue, the next table presents the distribution of outcomes, or 
dispositions, for these two most frequent remedies—i.e., whether the 
IHO/RO or court (1) granted the request fully, (2) granted it partially, 
(3) denied it altogether, or (4) disposed of it inconclusively.72 
 
                                                          
70 The percentages for the two remedies columns in this table are based on the 
number of rulings per type of remedy in each state as the numerator, and the 
respective total number of remedial rulings for the state as the denominator. 
71 This conclusion is purposely qualified in terms of “appears” because the 
comparisons are not subject to inferential statistical analysis, see supra note 66, and 
the cell sizes are limited—particularly for the last few states.  Conversely, it 
appears that the frequency was disproportionately low in Alaska for tuition 
reimbursement, and in Hawaii, New York, and Alaska for compensatory education. 
72 For the meaning of inconclusive in this context, see infra note 78. 
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Table 4.  Disposition of Predominant Remedies 
Remedy 
Granted in 
Full 
Granted in 
Part73 
Denied Inconclusive74 
Tuition and 
Related 
Reimbursement75 
(n=105) 
72 (69%) 16 (15%) 11 (10%) 6 (6%) 
Compensatory 
Education76 
(n=88) 
52 (59%) 15 (17%) 8 (9%) 13 (15%) 
 
Table 4 reveals that the pattern is similar for both remedies.  
More specifically, the plaintiff-parents were fully successful in more 
or less than two-thirds of the decisions, partially successful in 
approximately one-sixth of the decisions, and entirely unsuccessful in 
approximately one-tenth of the decisions upon the denial of FAPE. 77  
First, the higher full-success rate for tuition reimbursement 
                                                          
73 This outcome category included a few limited compensatory education 
awards that were inferably only partial. 
74 For compensatory education, this outcome category consisted of two 
ultimately separable groupings: (a) those decisions reserved for further adjudicative 
proceedings (e.g., Long v. District of Columbia, 780 F. Supp. 2d 49 (D.D.C. 2011) 
(remanding to IHO)) to determine whether the plaintiff-parent was entitled to 
compensatory education, and (b) those decisions delegated to the non-adjudicative 
mechanisms (e.g., J.T. v. Dep’t of Educ., 112 LRP 28283 (D. Haw. May 31, 2012) 
(ordering jointly paid IEE); Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Syosset Sch. Dist., 101 LRP 699 
(N.Y. SEA 2001) (remanding to IEP team to determine the amount of 
compensatory education)).  For tuition reimbursement, the category included the 
occasional remand to apply one of the requisite steps to determine entitlement.  
See, e.g., M.S. v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 553 F.3d 315 (4th Cir. 2009); Mr. and 
Mrs. M. ex rel. K.M. v. Ridgefield Bd. of Educ., 47 IDELR ¶ 258 (D. Conn. 2007). 
75 This category includes reimbursement for not only tuition in its narrow 
sense but also related services, tutoring, and the relatively few IEE-at-public-
expense decisions.  See supra note 48. 
76 Similarly broad in scope, this category included rulings where the order was 
in the form of other relief (e.g., prospective placement) that was reasonably 
inferably intended as compensatory education.  See supra note 49. 
77 Without the inconclusive rulings, the proportions are even closer to each 
other for the remaining three outcomes; for each of these two remedies, the 
proportions are as follows: 
 Tuition and related reimbursement:  72%  16% 11% 
 Compensatory education:    70% 20%   9% 
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corresponded to the higher proportion of inconclusive decisions for 
compensatory education.78  Second, in several of these cases, the 
fully or partially successful ruling for tuition reimbursement, or 
compensatory education, was in a decision that provided for contrary 
other rulings regarding FAPE issues and their remedies, thus 
providing mixed outcomes overall and mitigating the meaning of 
success.79  Third, the denials reflect not only the specific application 
of the equities,80 but also non-automatic equation of denial of FAPE 
with retrospective relief.81 
Finally, in response to the final question of the study,82 two 
qualitative observations stand out.  First is the notable lack, 
especially but not exclusively in the decisions at the IHO/RO level, 
of careful treatment in the remedies section of the written opinions of 
these cases.  In clear contrast with the factual findings and legal 
conclusions with regard to denial of FAPE, the analysis of what relief 
the parent is entitled to in terms of type and amount is in several 
cases limited to a brief order.  With the exception of tuition 
reimbursement, systematic legal analysis, with applicable citations, is 
more often than not absent.83  Second and as an interrelated matter, in 
                                                          
78 Specifically, the difference between the two remedies was 9% for each of 
these outcome categories. 
79 See, e.g., R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2012); 
Larson v. Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 361, 40 IDELR ¶ 231 (D. Minn. 2004); Anchorage 
Sch. Dist. v. D.S., 688 F. Supp. 2d 883 (D. Alaska 2009); Morgan Hill Unified Sch. 
Dist., 110 LRP 24090 (Cal. SEA 2010); Bridgewater-Raynham Reg’l Sch. Dist., 49 
IDELR ¶ 88 (Mass. SEA 2007). 
80 See, e.g., Dep’t of Educ. v. M.F., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1214 (D. Haw. 2011) 
(remanding to determine based on enumerated equities). 
81 See, e.g., Garcia v. Bd. of Educ., 520 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 2008) (assuming, 
without deciding, that the authorities denied the child of FAPE but denying 
equitable relief—in this case, compensatory education—in light of the student’s 
truancy and, thus, lack of benefit). 
82 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
83 See, e.g., Waukee Cmty. Sch. Dist., 48 IDELR ¶ 26 (Iowa SEA 2007), aff’d 
sub nom. Waukee Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Douglas L., 51 IDELR ¶ 15 (S.D. Iowa 2008) 
(ending in cryptic order to provide extended school year as compensatory 
education for extensive and detailed denial of FAPE affirmed upon judicial appeal 
without any analysis of the remedial issue); Oktibbeha Cnty. Sch. Dist., 37 IDELR 
¶ 57 (Miss. SEA 2002) (ordering compensatory education during summer for full 
year denial of FAPE without explanation and citation); Rancocas Valley Reg’l Bd. 
of Educ., 41 IDELR ¶ 46 (N.J. SEA 2004) (awarding unspecified amount of 
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cases where there was no unilateral placement, the limitation of the 
remedy to prospective relief was notable in the absence of any 
consideration of compensatory education.84 
 
III.   DISCUSSION 
 
Given its importance to not only the parent and child but also the 
district in terms of both justice and cost, the remedy obviously merits 
careful attention in the written opinions of IHOs/ROs and courts 
under the IDEA.  This limited study is merely exploratory, intended 
to stimulate more systematic quantitative and qualitative analysis of 
the remedial issue of not only FAPE but other issues under the IDEA, 
such as child find, eligibility, and least restrictive environment.85 
The first finding, which merely served as a transition to the 
analysis of remedies,86 was that FAPE violations were largely, in 
order of frequency, (1) substantive, (2) procedural, or (3) the 
combination of these two types,87 which the Rowley Court originally 
differentiated.88  Implementation is a more recent and infrequent 
issue, likely because it is more obvious and, thus, subject to 
resolution short of a final adjudicative decision, such as via 
settlement.  The predominance of substantive violations may seem at 
odds with the procedural primacy of Rowley, but appears to be 
                                                          
compensatory education for identified period of denial of FAPE prior to unilateral 
placement); Tyler Indep. Sch. Dist., 60 IDELR ¶ 259 (Tex. SEA 2012) (ordering 
continuing placement at private school without explaining whether this prospective 
component is compensatory education and how the IHO calculated it in relation to 
the denial of FAPE).  
84 Of the 119 decisions where tuition reimbursement was not at issue, almost 
half did not consider compensatory, or retrospective, relief. 
85 The corresponding study of remedies for claims under Section 504 and the 
ADA, which are partially on behalf of students also covered by the IDEA and 
which also extend to students only eligible under the broader definition of disability 
under Section 504 and the ADA, also merits attention.  Although not widely 
understood, the adjudicative avenue for parents under Section 504 extends to the 
IHO mechanism.  See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, The Public Schools’ Obligation for 
Impartial Hearings under Section 504, 22 WIDENER L.J. 135 (2012). 
86 In light of its limitations, this exploratory study did not extend to addressing 
whether the frequency or outcomes of remedies differed according to the type of 
FAPE violation.  
87 See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text. 
88 See supra notes 12–15 and accompanying text. 
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explainable in terms of the post-Rowley hybridization of the two 
types89 and ultimate overlap between them.90 
The second finding was that the most frequent remedies for 
FAPE violations were (1) tuition reimbursement91 (47% of the 
decisions) and (2) compensatory education (39% of the decisions).92  
The first-place predominance of tuition reimbursement in these 
FAPE-denial cases is not surprising in light of the relatively 
longstanding and systematic criteria for this remedy, which includes 
denial of FAPE as a key criterion93 and the high-stakes nature of this 
remedy.94  Similarly, the lesser predominance of compensatory 
                                                          
89 See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text. 
90 Akin to the mixed question of fact and law, which denial of FAPE ultimately 
is, procedural and substantive are far from mutually exclusive in the world of 
special education.  For example, the lack or insufficiency of measurable goals, a 
transition plan, and—at least where specified in corollary state special education 
laws—a functional behavioral analysis or behavior intervention plan are not merely 
procedural in terms of specified IEP ingredients but also substantive in terms of 
reasonable calculation of educational benefit. 
91 For economy of expression, the Discussion uses “tuition reimbursement,” 
which is the customary label for this remedy, to represent what the earlier sections 
of the Article refer to—as a reminder of the breadth and imprecision of its actual 
scope—as “tuition and related reimbursement.” 
92 See supra Table 1. 
93 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2006).  This codification was put in place by 
the 1997 Amendments of the IDEA, which in turn were attributable to the 
successive Supreme Court decisions in School Committee of Burlington v. 
Department of Education of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 359 
(1985), and Florence County School District Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993).  
For a flow-chart-like canvassing of the criteria, see Zirkel, supra note 8. 
94 Although some of these cases concerned lesser expenses, such as tutoring, 
tuition at a rate of $90,000 for a year for a day placement and much more for a 
residential placement are not difficult to find.  See, e.g., Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. 
R-1 v. Elizabeth E. ex rel. Roxanne B., 702 F.3d 1227, 1239 n.6 (10th Cir. 2012) 
(noting total cost of $9,800 per month for residential placement); R.E. v. N.Y.C. 
Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 180 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting tuition of $90,000 per 
year for day placement); C.L. ex rel. H.M. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 60 IDELR ¶ 
138 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting annual tuition of $125k for day placement).  At the 
outer extreme, a federal district court decision reported that as a result of an IHO 
decision, Hawaii spent approximately $250,000 per year for each of two children 
with autism, which inferably included private residential placement for each child.  
Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 372 F. Supp. 2d 591, 595 (D. Haw. 2005), rev’d, 513 F.3d 
922 (9th Cir. 2008).  The resulting protracted litigation reportedly resulted in a $4.4 
million settlement.  Mary Vorsino, State to Pay 4.4 Million in Landmark 
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education is in line with (1) its lack of recognition in the IDEA,95 (2) 
its relatively recent and less completely crystallized state in case 
law,96 and (3) its ready amenability in the wake of a FAPE-denial 
when the parent has not unilaterally placed the child.97  Conversely, 
the variety of other forms of relief fits with the broad equitable 
authorization under the IDEA98 and the prospective implications of a 
denial of FAPE.99 
The third finding is that courts address tuition reimbursement 
more frequently than IHOs/ROs do but that these two adjudicative 
forums do not differ for the frequency of compensatory education 
claims.100  The higher frequency for tuition reimbursement may be 
due, at least in part, to the more immediate and direct high stakes 
nature of this remedy, causing the increased likelihood of judicial 
appeal of the IHO/RO ruling; more specifically, a tuition 
reimbursement order is directly for a prompt lump-sum payment of 
what may well be a relatively high amount,101 thus being of major 
concern for both the parent and the district.  In contrast, 
compensatory education—although quite flexible and varied in 
form102—is often in the form of services to be delivered over a 
                                                          
Settlement, HONOLULU STAR ADVERTISER (Aug. 29, 2012), 
http://www.staradvertiser.com/s?action=login&f=y&id=167809065.  
95 The legislation does not specifically mention this remedy, and the 
regulations do so only via passing reference to “compensatory services” for the 
alternate avenue of the complaint resolution process.  34 C.F.R. §§ 300.151(b)(1), 
300.153(c) (2012).   
96 See supra note 9. 
97 First, unlike tuition reimbursement, compensatory education does not 
require a second prerequisite hurdle in terms of the appropriateness of the parent’s 
placement since there is none.  Second, in the absence of a unilateral placement, 
compensatory education would appear to be the default remedy in terms of 
retrospective relief. 
98 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
99 When an IHO/RO or court concluded that the district has not provided 
FAPE in the requisite specific terms of procedural, substantive, and/or 
implementation violations, the district has the basis and incentive for correcting the 
problem in the future to avoid further noncompliance and its costly consequences.  
Even in cases where the sole remedial issue is tuition reimbursement or 
compensatory education, which are retrospective, the prospective effect is implicit. 
100 See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text. 
101 See supra notes 91 and 94. 
102 See Zirkel, supra note 9, at 508–09. 
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relatively indefinite or protracted period.103 
The fourth finding is that the states of Hawaii, New Jersey, and 
New York appear to have a particular propensity for tuition and 
related reimbursement, while Pennsylvania and, to a lesser extent, 
Texas, have a particular propensity for compensatory education.104  
Part of the tuition reimbursement propensity among these states may 
well be a reflection of their high special education litigation rates.105  
Another possible contributing factor is systemic dysfunction in terms 
of providing appropriate special education services in the state as a 
whole106 or in population centers in these states.107  For 
compensatory education, the likely reasons for the particular 
                                                          
103 See, e.g., Bell v. Bd. of Educ., 52 IDELR ¶ 161 (D.N.M. 2008) (ordering 
tutoring and other educational assistance of fifteen hours per week for fifteen 
months); Bakersfield City Sch. Dist., 51 IDELR ¶ 142 (Cal. SEA 2008) (ordering 
one hour of social skills training per week for 12 months); Elizabethtown Area Sch. 
Dist., 50 IDELR ¶ 24 (Pa. 2008) (affirming compensatory education award of 720 
hours presumably during student’s remaining period of eligibility). 
104 See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
105 Perry A. Zirkel & Karen Gischlar, Due Process Hearings under the IDEA: 
A Longitudinal Frequency Analysis, 21 J. SPECIAL EDUC. LEADERSHIP 21, 31 
(2008) (finding that the states with the highest number of IDEA hearings in relation 
to their special education enrollments were New York, New Jersey, and Hawaii). 
106 See, e.g., Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(characterizing Hawaii, including a 1994 consent decree, as having “long struggled 
to provide adequate services to special needs students in compliance with state and 
federal law”).  
107 See, e.g., Amanda M. Fairbanks, Tug of War Over Costs to Educate the 
Autistic, N.Y. TIMES (April 18, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/19/education/19autism.html?_r=0 (reporting that 
cost of special education students’ private school tuition to New York City's school 
district increased from $57.6 million in 2007 to $88.9 million in 2008); Pam 
Belleck, Public Pays for the Learning-Disabled to Attend Private Schools, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 27, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/10/27/nyregion/public-pays-
for-the-learning-disabled-to-attend-private-schools.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm 
(reporting that increasing number of parents in New York City are bringing and 
winning tuition reimbursement claims, reflecting in and contributing to the school 
system's weaknesses).  Conversely, the high availability and use of private schools 
for special education placement may be a contributing factor in New Jersey.  See, 
e.g., Data Tables for OSEP State Reported Data – Table B3-2 (2011), INDIVIDUALS 
WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT (IDEA) DATA, 
https://www.ideadata.org/arc_toc13.asp#partbLRE (last visited Mar. 28, 2013) 
(showing that New Jersey as the state with the highest percentage of parental 
private placements). 
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propensity in certain states is more difficult to divine, but it may be 
due in part to the relaxed jurisdictional standards for compensatory 
education.108  However, these findings and their explanations are 
only tentative, because the analysis was limited to the seven most 
frequent states for these remedies, and the cell sizes for the lower half 
of them (e.g., Texas) were quite small.109 
The fifth finding is that the parents were fully successful in the 
clear majority of the rulings for both of these remedies, with the 
difference in favor of a higher proportion for tuition reimbursement 
matched by the higher percentage of inconclusive rulings for 
compensatory education.110  As a moderating threshold 
consideration, because the remedy is a consequential component of 
the overall issue of FAPE, these outcomes results are skewed.111  
More specifically, due to the integral overlap of these two remedies 
and denial of FAPE, the majority in favor of parents for tuition 
reimbursement or compensatory education is actually a minority in 
favor of parents in terms of their overall claim.  Viewed alternatively, 
because denial of FAPE is an essential element of the test for tuition 
reimbursement or compensatory education,112 the outcomes of the 
                                                          
108 Compare M.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Central Reg’l Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 389, 396 (3d 
Cir. 1996) (requiring only a more than de minimis denial of FAPE), with Mrs. C. v. 
Wheaton, 916 F.2d 69, 75 (2d Cir. 1990) (requiring a gross denial of FAPE).  Other 
factors must also be significant and interacting, because (1) in contrast with 
Pennsylvania’s relatively high proportion of compensatory education rulings, New 
Jersey, the other Third Circuit decision in this analysis, had a relatively low 
proportion of such rulings, and (2) the standard in New York has become more 
unsettled and relaxed during the period of this study, see e.g., P. ex rel. Mr. P v. 
Newington Bd. of Educ., 512 F. Supp. 2d 89, 112 (D. Conn. 2007), aff’d, 546 F.3d 
111 (2d Cir. 2008) (interpreting the gross denial standard to apply only in cases 
where the student is beyond age twenty-one). 
109 Additionally, a more comprehensive and intensive follow-up study would 
allow for examining the frequency and outcomes of the other types of remedies, 
which may have an interactive effect with tuition reimbursement and compensatory 
education. 
110 See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text. 
111 These interpretations are tentative, depending on the intervening 
consideration of the typology of issues (supra note 5) and the units of analysis 
(supra note 61). 
112 Although the multi-part of decisional framework of tuition reimbursement 
more obviously includes denial of FAPE, the analogous and more direct analysis 
for compensatory education encompasses the same foundational ingredient.  See 
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cases where parents sought either remedy are different and less 
favorable to the notable extent that the ruling is in favor of districts in 
the clear majority of the higher number of cases classified under 
FAPE.113  Given this restriction, the majority proportion in favor of 
parents for both remedies is not surprising, especially in light of the 
relatively relaxed standard for the second appropriateness step for 
tuition reimbursement114 and the aforementioned115 absence of any 
corresponding prerequisite for compensatory education.  Similarly, 
the notable minority of partially granted/partially denied requests for 
tuition reimbursement and compensatory education, which 
approximates one-sixth of the rulings for each remedy, fits with their 
clearly equitable nature.116  Finally, the lower parent-favorable 
proportion for compensatory education rulings, as compared with 
tuition reimbursement, is not surprising given its higher proportion of 
inconclusive rulings, i.e., where the adjudicator delegates the 
determination to further proceedings or processes.117 
The final findings, in the form of qualitative observations, were 
that in the cases for the remedies other than tuition reimbursement 1) 
the written treatment was often far from thorough, and 2) the 
exclusive use of purely prospective remedies was more frequent than 
expected.118  These interrelated observations suggest the need for 
                                                          
supra notes 8–9. 
113 See supra note 40.  The number of FAPE cases is sufficiently higher to 
infer that the overall majority is in favor of districts, but the specific proportions 
would require tabulating a combination of the FAPE with the tuition 
reimbursement and compensatory education categories, which is not available in 
the literature to date. 
114 Per the multi-part test outlined, supra note 8, this step refers to the parents’ 
unilateral, as contrasted with the district’s proposed, placement.  For the 
comparatively relaxed standard, see, e.g., Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 
510 U.S. 7 (1993); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.148(c) (2012). 
115 See supra note 97. 
116 This equitable nature is based not only on the overall broad remedial 
authorization in the IDEA (supra note 23 and accompanying text) but also the 
express equities elements in the Supreme Court’s and Congress’s tuition 
reimbursement analysis (supra note 8) and the judicial recognition of compensatory 
education as an analogous remedy (supra note 9).  
117 See supra note 78. 
118 See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text. 
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improvement.119  For example, when the aforementioned120 
delegation of compensatory education was to IEP teams, the 
adjudicator often ignored the relatively strong case law authority 
against doing so.121  Similarly, the failure of these IDEA 
adjudicators, particularly the IHOs/ROs, to identify and apply the 
case law concerning the standards for compensatory education more 
generally122 and the boundaries for the their remedies, such as 
prospective placement,123 is in stark contrast to the review norm of a 
“thorough and careful” opinion.124  Yet, the limits of improvement 
                                                          
119 Other remedial issues warrant systematic study and careful consideration 
among scholars and adjudicators.  For example, a leading consultant-trainer has 
suggested that the prospective order of the IHO/RO, upon finding a denial of 
FAPE, should specify what the new IEP must include to rectify its identified 
deficiencies.  For this purpose, he recommended that the IHO during the prehearing 
process have the parties clarify the remedy issue and forewarn them of the need for 
an evidentiary record as its basis.  Interview with Lynwood Beekman, Director, 
Special Education Solutions, in Albany, N.Y. (Nov. 2, 2013).  For an analogous 
suggestion, another leading expert on IDEA dispute resolution included in his 
proposal for a binding arbitration alternative the recommendation that the decision 
be in the form of a good IEP.  S. James Rosenfeld, It’s Time for An Alternative 
Dispute Resolution Procedure, 32 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 361, 374 
(2012). 
120 See supra text accompanying note 117. 
121 Bd. of Educ. v. L.M., 478 F.3d 307, 317–18 (6th Cir. 2007); Reid ex rel. 
Reid v. District of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (ruling, based on 
the impartiality and finality requirements, that IHOs/ROs may not delegate to the 
IEP the decision to discontinue or terminate the compensatory education award).  
This case law might be distinguishable as either being specific to jurisdictions that 
follow the qualitative approach or as being limited to termination or reduction, as 
per T.G. v. Midland Sch. Dist. 7, 848 F. Supp. 2d 902 (C.D. Ill. 2012), although the 
original rationale in Reid would seem to exceed such attempted boundaries.  Cf. 
Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. D.S., 688 F. Supp. 2d 883 (D. Alaska 2009) (reversing the 
part of the IHO’s order delegating approval authority to private provider for new 
IEP); Slack v. Del. Dep’t of Educ., 826 F. Supp. 115, 121–22 (D. Del. 1993) 
(ruling that decision that left the resolution to “a mechanism for evaluating the 
effectiveness of whatever private placement is utilized” violated the finality 
requirement).  In any event, such careful consideration is largely missing in the 
cases in this study’s sample.  
122 See supra note 9. 
123 See Zirkel, supra note 22, at 10 (citing Davis v. District of Columbia Bd. of 
Educ., 530 F. Supp. 1209, 1215 (D.D.C. 1982). 
124 See, e.g., M.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 685 F.3d 217, 241 (2d Cir. 2012); 
Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. M.P., 689 F.3d 1047, 1047 (9th Cir. 2012).  For a more 
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are not only systemic but also structural.  More specifically, 
IHOs/ROs in many states face systemic limits in terms of either 
compensation or specialization,125 and they face a challenging time 
limit.126  For courts, the presence of congestion and the lack of 
specialization are obvious.  Structurally, both IHOs/ROs and courts 
are largely reactive mechanisms, which are largely dependent on the 
parties’ action and which have limitations on raising issues or 
ordering relief sua sponte.127  The lack of attorneys with special 
expertise in IDEA cases in many parts of the country128 and the 
expanded permissibility of pro se representation by parents129 
contribute to the less than complete and optimal use of compensatory 
education. 
 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
 
For the parties in a FAPE case, if the adjudicator determines that 
the district has violated the applicable standards for denial, the most 
significant part of the decision is the explanation and expression of 
the remedy.  For the parent, it represents closure in terms of equitable 
justice that provides appropriate relief not only prospectively but also 
                                                          
detailed view of the norms for IHO/RO decision-making, see Perry A. Zirkel, 
“Appropriate” Decisions under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 33 
J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 242 (2013).  For the case law setting for the 
standards specific to compensatory education awards, see id. at 259 nn.75–76. 
125 Although there is an occasional exception, the part-time IHOs tend to have 
limited compensation, and the full-time IHOs/ROs tend to have such varied and 
broad jurisdiction that counters specialization in IDEA issues.  See, e.g., Zirkel & 
Scala, supra note 10, at 6. 
126 34 C.F.R. § 300.515 (2012) (45 days for IHO and 30 days for RO except for 
specific extensions in response to party request). 
127 See Zirkel, supra note 22, at 11–14.  The identified case law is specific to 
IHOs/ROs but also at least inferably applies to courts based on their institutional 
structure. 
128 See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Lay Advocates and Parent Experts Under the 
IDEA, 217 EDUC. L. REP. 19, 21–23 (2007); Kay Seven & Perry A. Zirkel, In the 
Matter of Arons: Construction of the IDEA's Lay Advocate Provision Too Narrow 
9 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 193, 219–203 (2002). 
129 Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 
(2007). 
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retrospectively.130  For the district, it represents the corresponding 
consequences in terms of both equity and expense.  Yet the 
systematic investigation and improvement of the remedial orders at 
both adjudicative levels under the IDEA, with special but not sole 
attention to the evolving efficacy of IHOs/ROs,131 have yet to receive 
adequate attention.  This exploratory study is intended to stimulate 
more thorough and thoughtful efforts in this direction. 
 
                                                          
130 Although implementation of the order is obviously in the future, the denial 
was in the past (possibly, depending on the circumstances since the initial filing, 
continuing to the present).  Thus, the use of “prospectively” and “retrospectively” 
in this context respectively refer to fixing the child’s IEP for the period subsequent 
to the order and compensating the child for the period previous to the order. 
131 Perry A. Zirkel, Zorka Karanxha, & Anastasia D’Angelo, Creeping 
Judicialization of Special Education Hearings: An Exploratory Study, 27 J. NAT’L 
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 27 (2007). 
